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when they interact with these systems [5]. For this, software de- 
Pervasive use of software applications continue to challenge user 
privacy when users interact with software systems. Even though 
privacy practices such as Privacy by Design (PbD), have clear in- 
structions for software developers to embed privacy into software 
designs, those practices are yet to become a common practice among 
software developers. The difficulty of developing privacy preserv- 
ing software systems highlights the importance of investigating 
software developers and the problems they face when they are 
asked to embed privacy into application designs. Software devel- 
opers are the community who can put practices such as PbD into 
action. Therefore identifying the problems they face when embed- 
ding privacy into software applications and providing solutions to 
those problems are important to enable the development of privacy 
preserving software systems. This study investigates 36 software 
developers in a software design task with instructions to embed 
privacy in order to identify the problems they face. We derive rec- 
ommendation guidelines to address the problems to enable the 
development of privacy preserving software systems. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
With the excessive use of connected services, such as mobile appli- 
cations, Internet of things and online networks, personal data of 
users are accessed, stored, processed and shared in ways users can- 
not control [27]. Users find it increasingly difficult to understand 
how their data is shared and processed once they disclose data into 
an online network, such as Facebook. However, this is not the user’s 
fault. Software systems that access and process user data should be 
designed with privacy, so that users’ privacy is not compromised 
velopers are expected to embed privacy into the software systems 
they design [25, 26]. 
In order to instruct software developers to embed privacy into 
software system designs, there are various privacy practices that 
are well established and widely known, such as Fair Information 
Practices (FIP) [29], Privacy by Design (PbD) [5] and Data Mini- 
mization (DM) [26]. The principle of DM states that data should 
only be collected if they are related to the purpose of the appli- 
cation, and should be processed only for the purpose for which 
they were collected. FIP says that users should have access and 
control over their data even after they disclose data into a system 
[29]. However, do developers really follow these practices when 
they design software systems? If software systems are designed to 
only process data for the purpose for which they were collected, 
and if users are given control over their data, we would not see the 
recent privacy scandal of Facebook, where Cambridge Analytica 
accessed and processed personal data of 50 million users without 
the users’ consent. Facebook’s response to the scandal saying that 
they would take strict measures to limit developers’ access to user 
data and ban developers who disagree to privacy audits indicate 
that developers privacy engagement may have a significant effect 
on such issues [10]. 
Software systems continuously failing user privacy suggests that 
the domain of software developers who can put practices such as 
PbD into action should be investigated to understand why they fail 
to design software systems with privacy [3]. Developers are either 
not considering these practices at all when they are asked to embed 
privacy into a software design or the way they implement these 
privacy practices in software systems is not satisfactory. Because 
of this, software applications end up being developed with privacy 
vulnerabilities, and this not only results in users losing their pri- 
vacy, but also in software development organizations losing their 
reputation and market value. For example, on the following day 
of the Cambridge Analytica incident, Facebook’s shares lost its 
market value by $58 billion [10]. Therefore, it is important that 
the issues developers face when they attempt to embed privacy 
into software applications are understood [3, 14]. Addressing these 
problems would enable the development of privacy practices that 
can effectively guide software developers to embed privacy into 
the software applications they design. 
For this, in this research, we investigate What are the issues devel- 
opers face when they attempt to embed privacy into software systems?. 
We assigned a software design task to 36 software developers and 
asked them to embed privacy into their design. Through a post task 
questionnaire we then investigated how participants embedded 
privacy into the software designs and what issues they faced when 
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they attempted embedding privacy into the software design. Our 
findings revealed that most developers lack formal knowledge on 
privacy practices. such as PbD, and that they try to integrate privacy 
features into software designs without much understanding. Partic- 
ipants also found privacy to contradict with system requirements 
and they had trouble evaluating whether they have successfully em- 
bedded privacy into a design. Based on these findings, we provide 
recommendation to help the development of practical and effective 
privacy practices to guide software developers to embed privacy 
into the software systems they design. 
 
 
2 RELATED WORK 
The effects of developers privacy engagement towards the result- 
ing privacy in software systems has become an interest of privacy 
researchers recently. There has been several recent studies that 
attempt to investigate how developers engage with privacy require- 
ments when they develop software systems. 
Most of these studies focus on organizational privacy practices. 
For example, Hadar et al. [14] revealed that organizational culture 
and policies play a significant role both positively and negatively 
in encouraging developers to consider privacy in their work. Sim- 
ilarly, both Sheth et al. [28] and Jain et al. [15] emphasize that 
organizations should setup policies and guidelines to guide soft- 
ware developers to embed privacy into the software systems they 
design. However, so far no one has investigated how organizations 
should setup these privacy policies, and what issues they need to 
address in these policies, so that they can effectively guide software 
developers to embed privacy into the software systems they design. 
Particularly focusing on the attitudes of software developers 
towards privacy, Ayalon et al. [3] say that developers reject pri- 
vacy guidelines that do not follow existing software frameworks. 
Similarly, Sheth et al. [28] say that developers find it difficult to 
understand privacy requirements by themselves when they develop 
software systems. Oetzel et al. [21] have said that developers require 
significant effort to estimate privacy risks from a user perspective. 
These investigations [3, 28] suggest that developers face problems 
when they attempt to embed privacy into software applications. It is 
said that through effective guidelines and practices developers could 
be nudged to make privacy preserving choices when they develop 
software applications [15]. However, for this, privacy guidelines 
and practices need to address the actual problems developers face 
when they try to embed privacy into software systems [15, 22, 31]. 
Nevertheless, so far no study has been conducted to identify the 
exact issues developers face when they attempt to embed privacy 
into software applications. 
In this research, we seek to empirically investigate the issues 
software developers face when they attempt to embed privacy into 
software systems. We focus on developers with industry experience 
in end user software application development. By this, we observe 
those who are asked to embed privacy into the applications they 
design. Through the grounded theory approach [18] we identify 
the issues developers face when they attempt to embed privacy into 
a software application design and then we relate these issues into 
guidelines that should be considered when establishing privacy 
practices for software developers. 
3 METHODOLOGY 
We designed this study to investigate the issues software developers 
face when they attempt to embed privacy into software systems. 
The complete study design was approved by the ethic committee 
of the University of New South Wales, Australia. 
Following similar security and privacy related studies that inves- 
tigate software developers [1, 33], we decided to conduct our study 
remotely, in order to encourage uncontrolled behavior in develop- 
ers. Previous work has shown that if special attention is given to 
designing the task, remote studies could be used to investigate the 
behaviors of participants in tasks ranging from simple surveys to 
prototype development [1, 19]. In this study we assigned a software 
application design task to the participants with a post-task ques- 
tionnaire. This approach was used to minimize the limitations in 
survey methodologies that arise due to participants’ memorability 
and recalling capacity of their usual actions when they answer 
questions [2]. By asking questions after the participants completed 
a design activity, we do not ask them about their general behav- 
ior. Rather we ask them about the task they completed. Therefore, 
rather than expressing what they think they would do, or what they 
think they did in the past, participants express what they did in the 
task. This way we aim to identify the exact issues developers face 
when they attempt to embed privacy into application design. Both 
the questionnaire and the design task were carefully evaluated and 
fine tuned through a pilot study with two experienced developers 
known to the authors and not related to the study. 
We used a health application as the scenario for this study as 
health data is highly sensitive and hence regulated in many regions 
around the world [20]. Therefore, privacy is a critical concern in 
health related software applications and thus this provides an ideal 
setup for our experiment [12, 17]. Following is the scenario we 
provided to the participants. 
You are required to design a web-based health-care application 
that allows remote consultation with medical professionals, general 
practitioners and specialists, for a payment. Users should be able to 
browse through a registered list of medical professionals and chat 
(text/video) with them on their health problems for advice. Doctors 
and health-care professionals can register on the application to earn 
by providing their expertise to users. The application is to be freely 
available on-line (desktop/mobile) and charge for individual consul- 
tations. You may consider advertising and data sharing with third 
parties such as insurance providers and hospitals to earn from user 
data. Consider user privacy as a requirement in this design. 
We recruited professional developers with industry experience 
from Github in order to obtain a diverse sample of participants, 
which is difficult to achieve when recruiting participants through 
local software development firms or university [33]. This is a widely 
accepted and commonly used method for participant recruitment 
for privacy (and security) research that require software developers 
[1]. We selected active Github committers from Java and PHP repos- 
itories as we were looking for end user application developers. We 
sent 6000 invitation emails with information on what developers 
had to do in the study, the duration of the study and the type of 
information we collect in the study. We also stated that the partici- 
pation was voluntary and that they could withdraw from the study 
at any time. All participants were given an amazon gift voucher 
Why developers cannot embed privacy into software systems? EASE’18, June 28–29, 2018, Christchurch, New Zealand 
 
 
of USD $15 as a token of appreciation. We received 118 responses 
to the invitations and to these developers we sent a second email 
with instructions to participate. This email had the ethic consent 
form, participant information sheet and instruction guidelines sheet 
attached. We first asked the participants to read and understand the 
participant information sheet and then sign and send us the ethic 
consent form which gave us the right to collect and store the study 
results. From the 118 developers who expressed their interest, only 
37 participants agreed to participate in the study, from which one 
entry was removed due to lack of quality. 
First, participants were asked to read the scenario for the applica- 
tion and design the application. Participants were explicitly asked 
to embed privacy into the design as we were focusing on conscious 
behavior. In designing the application, participants were first asked 
to identify the privacy impact for stakeholders of the application 
(ex: doctors, patients etc.). With this we aimed to observe how par- 
ticipants conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) [21]. Then, 
we asked them to list user data they wanted to collect for the appli- 
cation and give reasons for selecting each data element to observe 
how they apply DM when selecting data. Next, participants were 
asked to draw the information flow diagram for the application 
with privacy. With this, we aimed to observe the use of PbD and FIP 
practices to embed privacy into a software design, because it is said 
that information flow diagrams can be used to decide when and 
where to use privacy practices such as FIP and PbD [16, 35]. Finally, 
we asked for a database diagram to observe how participants would 
use database level privacy techniques as separation, aggregation 
and encryption [24]. By each of these steps we aimed to investigate 
the understanding of developers on the concepts behind well es- 
tablished privacy practices such as DM and PbD, and the way they 
incorporate these practices into their work when they are asked to 
embed privacy into a design. Through this we expected to identify 
the practical problems developers encounter when they attempt to 
embed privacy into a software design. Participants were given the 
freedom to use softwares or pen and paper in their designs. We pro- 
vided examples for each of the diagrams we requested (data-base 
sketches, information flow diagrams) in the instruction guide. 
Once the design activity was completed, participants were asked 
to share the diagrams with us through email or any other preferred 
method and fill out the post-task questionnaire. The questionnaire 
was designed to investigate the problems participants faced when 
they attempted embedding privacy into the designs. For example, 
we first asked the participants “Did you use the concept of DM 
when you decided to collect data?”. If they said yes, we asked them 
to explain how they used it in the design. If they said no, we asked 
the participants “Why didn’t you use DM in your design?”. Finally, 
we also asked them if they knew the concept of DM and whether 
they had used it before in order to test their formal knowledge 
on the concept. The direct questions with yes/no answers in the 
questionnaire were designed following the methods for theory 
testing and modification requirements in quantitative research [23]. 
Open ended questions that encouraged descriptive answers were 
designed with the aim to build theories on the issues developers 
face when they embed privacy into a software application [23]. 
When analyzing the results, we first checked participants’ an- 
swer to the yes/no questions to test whether they had consciously 
followed privacy practices, such as DM, when they were embedding 
privacy into their designs. Then we analyzed the designs to observe 
how participants had embedded privacy into the designs. This also 
helped us to investigate if the participants had used the concepts 
behind the privacy practices such as DM and relate it to what they 
claimed in the questionnaire. Then we analyzed participants’ for- 
mal knowledge on the privacy practices to see how developers’ 
knowledge affected the way they embed privacy into the applica- 
tions they design. Finally, from their answers to the open ended 
questions we identified the issues they faced when they attempted 
to embed privacy into the application designs. The descriptive an- 
swers were coded in Nvivo [11], by using a self coding scheme 
[34]. First all answers were summarized and two coding schemes 
were generated by two researchers. As these two were similar and 
interchangeable, one coder then coded all answers using one coding 
scheme. These codes were then categorized and analyzed in several 
iterations following the grounded theory approach [7] to identify 
the issues (thematic analysis). We made use of the observations we 
made from the design diagrams and yes/no questions to guide us in 
extracting the issues through the codes. Due to space constraints, 
here we only present the final set of issues identified. 
 
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We identified a total of 5 issues after merging 18 codes through 
3 iterations. We reached theoretical saturation in the qualitative 
analysis at 17 participants. Table 01 shows the five themes that 
represent the issues we identified from the study. Next, we discuss 
these issues in detail with our observations. 
 
4.1.1 Participants complained that privacy contradicts system re- 
quirements. Most participants identified privacy as a non-functional 
requirement (83.3%). Whether privacy is a functional requirement 
or not would be a subject for another debate, however, because par- 
ticipants identified it to be non-functional they considered system 
requirements should be given priority over privacy requirements. 
It is true that privacy requirements mostly contradict system re- 
quirements when developing software applications [9]. However, 
as suggested by the PbD principles, achieving privacy in a software 
design should not necessarily mean that the application’s func- 
tionality is compromised [5, 6]. Nevertheless, these are complex 
decisions that require management support, and in order to get 
management support developers need to raise these concerns to 
the management. If developers themselves make the decision that 
system requirements should get precedence, privacy concerns are 
likely to not get implemented at all. Our findings indicate that when 
instructed to consider privacy in the design, participants do not give 
priority to privacy requirements. Because of this, some participants 
had purposely disregarded some privacy techniques altogether. For 
example, P3 said, developer has to give priority to the client/business 
requirements, if I want to identify polish immigrants with diseases, 
I need last names or ethnic backgrounds. Would the anonymization 
process retain enough of a correlation there?. This participant had 
disregarded both anonymization and pseudonymization in the de- 
sign, which are important privacy preserving techniques in data 
collection [28]. Similarly some participants claimed that they dis- 
regard privacy requirements as a designer because privacy and 
system requirements mostly don’t get along. Participants did not 
know how to achieve privacy together with system requirements 
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Table 1: Issues participants faced when embedding privacy into the designs 
 
Issue Representative Quotes Coverage (out of 36) 
Contradiction Requirements in this design contradict with privacy requirements 27.6% (10) 
Relating  requirements  to 
practice 
How can I implement the fair information practices?, embedding privacy is too complex 33.3%(12) 
Assurance I tried to use the theories in the design but I’m not sure if I really did, I think I did, I don’t 
know if I have done it right 
38.8%(14) 
Personal opinion storing raw data in the db does not affect the privacy 16.7%(6) 
Lack of knowledge I did not use the this privacy theory because I don’t know them, I haven’t heard of PIA 19.4% (7) 
 
because they had trouble relating privacy techniques into privacy 
requirements, which leads to the next problem we identified. 
 
4.1.2 Participants had trouble relating privacy requirements into 
privacy techniques. From the information flow diagrams and data- 
base designs of the participants we could observe that some had 
attempted to incorporate privacy techniques such as anonymiza- 
tion and data separation when processing and storing data in the 
application design (Aggregation = 23, Separation = 25, Anonymiza- 
tion = 20, Pseudonimization = 11, Data Expiry (Storage period) = 
18, Encryption = 22, out of 36). However, these numbers are not 
satisfactory. For example, 16 out of 36 developers failing to con- 
sider anonymization in the design, when they were asked to embed 
privacy into the design suggests that developers find it difficult to 
map technical features into privacy requirements. Oetzel et al. [21] 
have also stated that developers do not know privacy requirements 
such as DM could be fulfilled by technical implementations such as 
anonymization and pseudonimization through which user’s iden- 
tity is separated from their personal data. This lead to participants 
not incorporating privacy techniques adequately into their designs. 
Because of the difficulty to relate privacy requirements into 
techniques they could implement, participants also claimed that 
application of privacy into a design was complex. For example, P5 
said, The principles are complex and lengthy, how can I implement 
them?. Previous work has also challenged privacy practices such as 
PbD for being complex and too theoretical to be used within the 
software development processes [13, 21, 30, 32]. These privacy prac- 
tices are mostly generated through social and legal research [4, 21], 
in order to broadly capture a vast amount of privacy requirements 
and present them in an abstract form, such as the respect for user 
privacy principle in PbD. The implementation of these principles 
requires a lot of work from a developer’s end. However, participants 
demonstrated frustration when they had to make decisions, such 
as when to encrypt, when to anonymize and to which level privacy 
should be considered while embedding privacy into the application. 
Software developers are from a technical background and therefore 
it was difficult for them to grasp these soft decisions. For example, P7 
said I think that striving for perfection has no borders, I should know 
to which extent..., because these are not measurable decisions that 
can be quantified, such as coding errors, which developers are used 
to [21]. P32 said, A developer just needs to get stuff out the door so 
they can eat. Although I take privacy and security very importantly, 
in my experience it is very difficult to make it work like this. 
 
4.1.3 Participants had trouble verifying their work. One partici- 
pant (P14) who claimed s/he had practiced PbD in the answers to 
the post-task questionnaire had not encrypted the contact details of 
the participant. This participant had not anonymized users in the 
database either. From such a design users’ contact details could be 
easily leaked through a database hack, which could lead to a privacy 
and a security breach of system users. However, since there was 
no criteria for evaluation in PbD, after partially applying PbD the 
participant claimed that s/he used PbD in the design. Spiekermann 
[30], has said that guidelines such as PbD, give a developer the 
feeling that all s/he has to do is to select some privacy techniques 
and embed them into an application, whereas in reality the expecta- 
tions of the guidelines are deep and challenging. However, without 
a criteria for evaluation developers cannot say whether they have 
adequately addressed these expectations in a design. 
Because of this, almost half of those who claimed they used 
privacy practices such as DM and PbD had difficulty in describing 
how they applied the practice in the design. For example, most 
participants claimed they used the concept of DM (75%), however, 
when they were asked to explain, they said that they were not sure 
if they did it right. This was further accentuated by P11 who said 
that I used data minimization, but I don’t think I have made a good 
one, I tried to make it work, and also by P32, All of the questions 
here asked if I understand specific aspects and used them; without 
[evaluating] the way I used them, one would have a hard time saying 
yes. These remarks suggest that participants had difficulty ensuring 
that they have practiced a privacy theory right. Because of this 
some participants attempted to use concepts such as aggregation 
for data storage and had given up later on (P15 & P8) in the design 
as they had no feedback to know what they were doing was right. 
P11 said One needs to formalise these processes so that we *know* 
it is being done right. Need for evaluation and demonstration of 
assurance was also coined by the ENISA guidelines for Privacy 
and Data Protection by Design [8]. Evaluation and feedback would 
make it easy for a third party or for the practitioner himself to 
verify whether or not s/he has practiced a guideline successfully 
and also reduce developer’s personal opinions affecting the way 
they embed privacy into software applications, which is the next 
issue we identified. 
4.1.4 Participants personal opinions affected the way they em- 
bedded privacy into the design. Some participants in our study said 
that techniques like encryption and data expiry are not important 
for privacy. P7 said I don’t see how plain text storage of these data in 
secure database affect user privacy and P23 said expiring data [delet- 
ing data after a period] is not important. P7 said These are all general 
information that does not violate much of user privacy. P7 had not in- 
corporated any privacy technique at database level and P23 had not 
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considered data expiry because they thought these techniques were 
not important. Developers’ personal opinions that go against best 
practices for embedding privacy into software applications hence 
affected the way developers embedded privacy into the application 
design. Ayalon et al.[3] have also claimed that developers’ personal 
privacy preferences significantly affect the way they embed privacy 
into software applications. This happens because developers are 
not privacy experts and they lack knowledge and formal education 
on privacy practices and data protection requirements. 
 
4.1.5 Participants lacked knowledge on privacy practices. Sur- 
prisingly most participants had no formal education or knowledge 
on well known privacy theories that are widely discussed and ap- 
preciated within the community of privacy researchers. Figure 01 
shows the knowledge and the trainings the participants had had 
on four well known privacy practices. 
The number of participants who had not even heard of these 
theories surprised us. Almost 70% of the participants did not have 
experience using at least one of the privacy practices we investi- 
gated (DM - 30, FIP - 31, PbD - 31, PIA - 32, PET - 26 out of 36). All 
participants in our study were either end user application devel- 
opers, or had past experience in end user application development 
(least experienced participant had1 year of experience). Therefore, 
majority of them having no experience with commonly used pri- 
vacy practices suggests the lack of formal education in developers 
on privacy. When observing the designs we noticed that partic- 
ipants who had previous experience and who knew the privacy 
practices had better privacy in their designs compared to those who 
tried to use the concepts behind those practices without formal 
education. For example, 10 participants said they did a PIA when 
doing the stakeholder analysis. However, from their submissions 
we observed that only 2 out of those 10 had conducted a successful 
PIA and both of them had used PIA before and had been trained on 
PIA. Nevertheless, we also observed participants who had previous 
experience with PIAs, that had incomplete PIAs in their designs 
where they had either not identified all stakeholders, or disregarded 
privacy impact on some stakeholders. For example, one participant 
said that Doctors should not have any privacy concerns here, as they 
are the service providers. Therefore, when educating developers on 
privacy practices, they should be trained and educated properly. 
Otherwise, incorrect application of practices could give developers 
a false sense of satisfaction that their software products are privacy 
inbuilt, whereas in reality the applications have incomplete privacy 
features built in. 
 
5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
We recommend the following guidelines to address the issues we 
identified through the experiment. 
 
ï Privacy guidelines should be simple, straightforward and 
explicit as developers have trouble executing soft decisions. 
ï Developers should be given formal education on privacy 
practices as developers’ lack of knowledge affects their per- 
sonal opinion which interferes the way they embed privacy 
into designs. 
ï Privacy guidelines should have steps for evaluation. 
ï Privacy requirements should be specified with engineering 
techniques such as anonymization, as developers find it dif- 
ficult to relate privacy requirements into engineering tech- 
niques. 
 
These recommendations would help addressing the issues we 
identified in this research. We intentionally disregarded concerns 
developers raised that related to their work environment when 
they practiced privacy as our study did not investigate the orga- 
nizational constraints that affected developers privacy practices. 
Previous work that focuses on organizational privacy climate [14] 
has identified the importance of infrastructural support within the 
software development industry for developers to practice privacy 
when they develop software. Our study was designed to focus ex- 
plicitly on the issues developers face as individuals when they are 
asked to embed privacy into software applications. When organi- 
zations provide infrastructural support and the environment for 
developers to practice privacy these issues needs to be addressed 
to make that support effective. 
With the phenomenon of privacy engineering, translating vague 
privacy concepts into engineering solutions for software developers 
has become an attractive area of research [13]. The systematic 
approach for PIA proposed by Oetzel et al. [21] is one example 
which shows the development of privacy engineering solutions for 
developers to practice privacy within their development practices. 
However, privacy engineering as a phenomenon is still emerging 
and initiations similar to ours are important for the development 
of practical privacy engineering solutions that address the issues of 
software developers. Our work contributes to the knowledge that is 
needed by privacy engineers and the academia in order to develop 
effective privacy guidelines for software developers. 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This research attempts to identify the issues faced by software 
developers when they attempt to embed privacy into software 
applications. Based on the findings of the study we derive guidelines 
to effectively support software developers when they attempt to 
embed privacy into software applications. However, the relatively 
small sample of participants in the study should be taken into 
account in generalizing our findings. 
Our findings indicate that developers have practical issues when 
they attempt to embed privacy into software applications. Develop- 
ers find it difficult to relate privacy requirements into engineering 
techniques and they lack knowledge on formally established pri- 
vacy concepts such as PbD, which are well known in the domain 
of privacy research. Because of this the solutions researchers im- 
plement, expecting developers to be well versed with the privacy 
concepts may not work in software development environments. 
When developers lacked knowledge, their personal opinions and 
complex system requirements seem to take precedence over privacy 
requirements which eventually result in software applications with 
limited or no privacy embedded. Therefore we suggest that devel- 
opers should be given formal education on privacy practices. More 
studies to formally evaluate developers’ engagement and experi- 
ence with existing privacy practices and identify personal opinions 
of developers that could affect their decisions in embedding privacy 
EASE’18, June 28–29, 2018, Christchurch, New Zealand Awanthika Senarath and Nalin A. G. Arachchilage 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Participants’ Formal Knowledge on Privacy Concepts 
 
into software applications would be interesting avenues to continue 
this research. 
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